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CONTRACT, TRUST, AND RESISTANCE 
IN THE SECOND TREATISE 
RORY J . CONCES 
I: Introduction 
If there is a single problem that has dominated political thought 
for the past four hundred years, it is the tension within the body 
politic between the will of the collective, as it is expressed by 
those vested with authority and power, and the will of the indi-
vidual. Among political theorists who have examined this prob-
lem, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke viewed this potentially 
ruinous tension in radically different ways. In his Leviarhan, 
Hobbes presents the problem of how we are to conduct our-
selves as a society, an apparent dilemma whose horns are anar-
chy and servile absolutism. Either we submit to the constraints 
imposed upon us by government, or we accept the dire conse-
quences of his infamous state of nature. Since he was well 
acquainted with the strife of a war-torn Europe (including the 
Thirty Years' War (1618-48] in Central Europe and the first 
Civil War ( 1642-46) in England), the choice was an easy one 
for Hobbes. He leaves no doubt that the dissolution of govern-
ment is the single worst misfortune, resulting in a condition in 
which 'the li fe of man, [is] solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and 
short'.' It is therefore to man's advantage to leave this state, by 
accepting absolute sovereignty as the only rational alternative. 
Like Hobbes, Locke witnessed the turmoil of his age. Yet he 
did not advocate authoritarian rule. Rather, he is known as a 
champion of liberty, natural rights, and consent as the only basis 
1 Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan, ed. C. }.facpherson (Harmondswonh 1975). ch. 
13, para. 8. 
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of political society and government. Although an ardent believer 
in law and order, Locke was aware that an inordinate fear of 
anarchy cou ld eventually lead to an overly intrus ive or oppres-
sive state, the hallmark of which would be the diminution of 
individuals' liberties. Not wishing to compromise the moral 
inviolability of persons, Locke sought to protect liberties by 
arguing for what has been called the 'liberal state'. To what 
extent Locke's state can be characterized as the minimal or 
'night-watchman' state of classica l liberal political theory is 
open to debate,l but his liberal posture is shown by his 
·emphasis on conslitutionalism, that is, the insistence on political 
guarantees for the maintenance of individual liberties' .3 Locke 
recognized, however, that no judic ial mechanism could guaran-
tee the liberties of individuals, that it would always be possible 
for the state apparatus to circumvent or undermine any protec-
ti ve measure. and so he advocated a 'revolutionary liberalism' in 
which resistance to governmental authority could be undertaken 
2 For a discussion of 1hc night-watchman state, see R. Noiick, Anarchy, Stott, 
a11d 11wpiu (New York 1974), pp. 26,-7 and J. Paul (ed:), Reading No,Jck: ~ays on 
'Anar,:hy, S111te, and utopia' (Tocowa, NJ 1981). No1o1ck, a hbe~nan, _re,,1ves !he 
Locki.an claim that •a minimal state, limi1ed 10 the narrow functK>ns 01 protecllon 
again$t force, 1he(1, fraud, enforcement of _contracts, and so on, is juS1ified;. th~ any 
more ex1ensive stale will violate persons· rights not to be forced to do certain t.hmgs, 
aod is unjustified; and that the 1ninimal state is inspiring as well as right' (p. ix). ll is 
wonh noting, as Manin Seliger has done in Tht liberal polltlcJ of John wd<e 
(LOn<lon J 968), pp. 18-20, chat 1he throry and practice of libera_lisn1 has a~ually 
(..died for s1toilg government rather than the ·minimafol' state that LS often au~t,uted 
to it. 11,is becomes cspccially clear when we oonsidet how the hotly debated 'hberal' 
plan (or universal hcahh insurance coverage in the USA is to be implemented. 
l Seliger. op. cit .. p. 2 1. h is impor1Mt to note that some con1tmPora.ry com-
munitarians frequentJy criticize rights-based liberalism for an undue emphasLs upon 
individual liberties and a corresponding neglect of the community. They make the 
case that the mc.mbcrs.hip of a community is panl)' defined by the community they 
inhabit. See. for example, S. Avineri & A. De~Shalit (eds), Communitarianism and 
i11dividualism (Oxford 1992); S. Mulhall & A. Swift, Lit,e.rals and communito.rfons 
(Oxford 1992); and M. J. Sandel, U~uclism and the Um/IS of justice (Cambridge 
1982). 
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without fear of tearing apart the fabric of society and without 
fear of moral impropriety , particularly since resistance becomes 
legitimized once all avenues of legal recourse have been 
exhausted. There is little doubt that Locke took the evils of 
rebellion to be an acceptable risk in the event that a ruler 
betrayed the trust reposed in him by his subjects.• 
But why did Locke allow for the possibility of resistance 
knowing that it could lead to a state of anarchy? Why was such 
a risky venture found acceptable by Locke? Why did he think 
that anarchy and authoritarian rule did not exhaust the possi-
bilities, thereby allowing him to escape through the horns of the 
Hobbesian dilemma? The reasons lie principally in his umbrella 
concept of consent, which underwrites his doctrine of resistance, 
as well as his confidence that the integrity of the community can 
be maintained even in the absence of authoritarian rule. More 
specifically, his notion of consent, which seems to cover 'all 
instances of deliberate, voluntary alienation of rights (and 
undertakings of obligations)' ,s reflects an understanding of 
institutions which distinguishes the dissolution of government 
from the dissolution of political society. Although a quick 
reading of the Second Treatise might leave the impression that 
political society and government form an amalgam, created by a 
single consensual agreement made by those individuals who 
have decided to leave the state of nature, such a reading would 
mean that political society and government are coterminous.6 
"' II has been argued lha1 Locke·s ponrayal of the state as a potential aggressor is 
prcmimd on his notion or libeny or negative freedom. for example, S. L. Newman, 
' l..ockc·s 1\\-'0 t~otis<:s and «>mcmporary thought', in Joh11 UJcke'J Tho Jnatis<s of 
g<n·t:mm1;111: New foterpretations, ed. E. J. Harpham (Lawren~ 1992), p. 180. 
5 A. J. Simmons. Or, 1he ~.dge Qf curarchy: Locke. mnJ.t!n.t, an.d lhl! limilS of 
sodety (Princeton 1993), p. 69. 
0 John Locke, Th<> treClli~·ts of gowmmelll, ed. P. Laslen (Cambridge 1960). 
Rererences 10 1he Sec.ond Treatise are given by ·11· foUowod by a sea.ion number 
(e.g., 11 . 4), 
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Not only would the integrity of the community be in jeopardy, if 
the initial consent were abrogated for want of a new leader, but 
the liberties and interests of the individual members of the com-
munity would be at risk as well. But by asserting that these 
institutions are nnt one and the same, and that there is a plurality 
of agreements tha t create political society and government, 
Locke seems to have acknowledged an institutional logic that 
allowed for the dissolution of government without compromising 
the integrity of political society. In other words, Locke's view 
satisfies what may be called the integrity condition. Such a line 
of thought seems, however, from the perspective of the individ-
ual members of the community, to allow for nothing short of 
rebellion to safeguard their liberties and interests from a tyrant. 
Locke did not, however, merely adopt a Dual-Consent (D-C) 
Theory of politica l society and government, for the institutional 
logic amounted to more than simply calling for separate con-
sensual agreements of the same ki nd. Some sort of institutional 
arrangement o r practice was needed to acknowledge the moral 
inviolability of the individuals of the community, and to serve as 
notice to the sovereign that his actions would be met with legiti-
mate resistance if he did not meet certain standards of perform-
ance. It had 10 meet what may be called the moral inviolability 
condition. To this end Locke employed a Contract-Trust (C-T) 
Theory-shown by the fact that the Second Treatise teems with 
the words 'contract' and ' trust' -in which a contract brings 
about the onset of political society and a trust establishes 
government. It is crucial to note that what distinguishes trust 
from contract, according to Locke's view, is that trust is a con-
sensual agreement between the people and the ruler which allo-
cates rights and obligations in a way that favours the individual 
members of the community. Characteristic of trust, then, is this 
mora l bias towards those who are ru led. This paper examines 
the grounds for interpreting this theory as one that, in meeting 
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the conditions of integrity and moral inviolability, allows Locke 
to escape through the horns of the Hobbesian dilemma. 
The organization of the paper is as follows: Part II gives an 
account of Locke's state of nature and the origin of political 
society; Pan Ill of various questionable views regarding Locke's 
treatment of the consensual foundations of political society and 
government, as well as the C-T Theory. Part IV then offers the 
C-T Theory, with regard to some of the literature on the Second 
Treatise, as a view that accords well with the conditions of 
integrity and moral inviolability as understood within Locke's 
doctrine of resistance. 
II: The State of Nature and the Origin of Political Society 
To appreciate Locke's attempt to justify resistance within his lib-
eral framework, we need to delineate what is political and what 
is not. Understanding the state of nature and the origin and 
justification of political socie1y is thus essential for understand-
ing Locke's idea of the bounda ries of political authority. The 
state of nature is, as A. J. Simmons has shown, a relational con-
cept in so far as a person, A, is in a State of nature with respect 
to another person, B, if and only if A has not voluntarily agreed 
co become a member of (or is no longer a member of) a legiti-
mate political society of which B is a member.7 It not only 
refers to a State of affairs in which pre-political persons existed, 
but also refers to a p~t-political state, like that which results 
from civil war or tyranny.8 Much of Locke's early discussion of 
the state of nature seems to refer to the pre-political person, 
though it is not difficult to imagine it referring to the post-
1 Simmons, op. cit., p. 21. 
• A. J. Simrnons, 77,e U.x:ktu11 tlr~ory of rigJus (Prinocton 1992), p. t 29. 
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political person as well. ln chapters 2-5 of the Second Treatise, 
Locke portrays the state of nature as the 'State all Men are natu-
rally in, and that is, a Stare of perjec1 Freedom to order their 
Actions. and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they 
think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking 
leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man' (II. 4). It 
is not a state of licence, but rather of natural liberty in which the 
law of nature is the sole guide that prohibits persons from inter-
fering with the property (taken in a very broad sense to include 
life, liberty, and property as we understand it today) of another 
except in cases in which the law of nature is transgressed (11. 6 
and 87). And since Locke took this law to be a law of reason or 
' principle of conduct', he also took it to be part of man's 
nalUre.9 
Rationality, however, is neither man 's only characteristic nor 
the most influential one when it comes to life in the slate of 
nature. Affective responses, like self-love and revenge, show 
that men often refuse the guiding light of the law of nature by 
being partial in their judgements and violent in their punishment. 
Indeed, our being rational creatures does not mean that we do 
not get in each other's way. This led Locke to make the strong 
c laim that the greater part of mankind does not strictly observe 
equality and justice (11. 123). 
Although Locke begins with a description of a tranquil, idyl-
lic state of nature, this is by no means the situation that prompts 
men to join together to form a community. Indeed, why would 
anyone want to quit such a peaceful way of life for one full of 
anxiety, deceit, and violence? Rather, what compels people to 
j oin together to form a community is the fact that not everyone 
respects the rights of other people, which eventually transforms 
this idyllic state into something resembling the Hobbesian state 
of war. Although it is a state of natural liberty, it is also a state 
0 L. J. Mac:foJ'lat1e. Modem political 1J:eO?' (New Yott 1973), p. 8. 
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in which some transgress the law of nature and place themselves 
in a state of war with others. As Locke put it, '[H]e who 
attempts to get another Man into his Absolute Power, does 
thereby pu1 himself imo a State of War with him; It being to be 
understood as a Declaration of a Design upon his Life' (11. 17). 
It is they, the transgressors of this law, who follow the rule of 
force and violence rather than the rule of reason (11. 16).10 In 
order to preserve property, in the broad sense of the term, and 
to punish those who act contrary to this end, men recognize that 
they must consolidate their power and move from a condition in 
which they have natural liberty and follow the law of nature, to 
one in which they have civil liberty and are governed by stand-
ing laws (II. 22). In other words, they recognize the need to 
form political society, and hence they give their consent to its 
10 There, arc other in1erpre1a1ions or Loc-ke's state of nature. ln Ltx.·k~ on """'' and 
p«uce (Oxford 1960). pp. 45-105, R. H. Cox ariuos 1ha1 the Second Trea1ise offers 
1wo variations of the s1a1e of nature: an e.arly one (SON ·E) alld a late one (SON·L). 
SON-E ttfel"$ 10 the pris.tine condition of man prior to political societ)' and political 
power, whereas SON•L refers to the state of affairs in which political power has been 
parcelled out to individuals in order to erect a new po1ity. In 04her words, SON-6 is a 
state of peace. whereas SON·L is a state or disorder. 
According 10 an0thcr view, however, Lo<:ke's sr.uc or nature is not a ·go\'eto-
me,n1less phlkSe' in 1he developme<u of political society, bu1 rather an imerpretath·e 
1001 10 illus1ra1e the fundamental rights of men as well as a description of a situation 
1ha1 obtains belwt?Ctt stales and belw"n individuals. Set Stliger, op. cit., pp. 82-4. 
Silllilatly, Joh1l Dullll, in TIie poli1ica/ 1!,okJ;hl of Jolm lock~: An his,orical account 
of 1/f<'. 11rgumenr of the 'TW<., trCiltiS('..$ of gowrnmenr' (Cambridge 1969), contends that 
'the sca1c of nature. that state tha1 "all Men are naturally in'", is noc an asocial condi-
tion but :m shiSlorical condition. h ii that state in which men are set by God. The 
state of nature is a topic for theological reflection, not for anthropological research' 
Cp. 97). 
And s1ill othets tal<e the view 1ha1 it is plausible 10 consider 1he hi$10ticity of 
Locke's state of nature. Simmons. for example. says so: 'There is, then, no 
inconsistency or confusion involved in Locke's using the state of nature sometimes as 
an analytical device (10 explain and discuss 1he nature of the political relationship), 
sometimes to describe a historical condition of people, sometimes 10 desc-ribe a moral 
or social condi1ion ol possible or conternporaty persons. All are perfectly proper 
applicaiions of 1he ooncepf (On 1h< edge of anarchy, p. 23). 
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formation. This line of thinking is summarized as follows by 
Locke: 
[T]herc, and there only is Political Society, where every one of the Mem-
bers hath quitted this natural Power, resig.n'd it up into the hands of the 
Communi1y in all cases thal exclude him not from appealing for Protec-
tion to 1he Law es1ablished by ii. And thus all private judgemenl of every 
par1icular Member being excluded, the Community comes to be Umpire, 
by seuled standing Rules, indifferent, and 1he same 10 all Parties; and by 
Men having Aulhority from the Community, for the execution or those 
Rules, decides all the differences 1hat may happen between any Members 
of thal Society, concerning any mauer of right: and punishes 1hose 
Offences, which any Member ha1h commiued against the Sociely, wi1h 
such Penalties as the Law has established: Whereby it is easie to discern 
who are, and who are not, in Politlcal Sociery together. Those who are 
united into one Body, and have a common cstablish'd Law and Judicature 
10 appeal to, with Au1hority 10 decide Controversies between them, and 
punish Offenders, are i11 Civil Society one with another: but those who 
have no such common Appeal, I mean on Earth, a.re still in the state of 
Nature, each being, where there is no other, Judge for himself, and 
Executioner: which is. as I have before shew'd it, the perfect state of 
Na,ure. (II. 87) 
The community that is formed seems to be a response to the 
darker side of man's nature. Precisely for this reason political 
society is the most efficient and enduring means by which the 
more productive side of human nature can be nurtured. A rela-
tively secure social environment is the result of the initial con-
sent. 
Ill : Consensual Foundations of Political Society and Government 
Is the initial consent restricted 10 the formation of political 
society or does it establish government as well? This is an 
extremely important question, for the answer will tell us if 
Locke's doctrine of resistance is compatible with the integrity of 
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the communil)' . At first glance, this compatibility seems to be in 
jeopardy. The difficulty stems in part from the fact that Locke 
sometimes writes as though he collapses the distinction between 
society and government. If so, Locke's doctrine of resistance 
could be viewed, and rightly so, as being antagonistic to the 
integrity of the community. This is not surprising, given Locke's 
shifting use of language. As Grant indicates, one of the ways in 
which Locke uses the word 'government'-designated here by 
·governmem1 '-suggests that political society coexists with 
government1: Whenever people come together to preserve their 
property by creating a community, they must have also created 
government, .11 The former cannot exist without the latter, and 
vice versa. Take, for instance, II. 87 cited above. Locke not 
only suggests that political society is an institution in which the 
natural powers of each individual are consolidated by a single 
consent, but he also suggests that this union brings about some 
sort of governing apparatus associated with the rule of law (sup-
porting what I call the Single-Consent [S-C] Theory of political 
society and government). More specifically, the consent of each 
member empowers the majority 10 act as the governing body of 
rhe com mu nil)' . Majority rule is a feature of the onset of politi-
cal society, inherent in its genetic structure. Again , in a familiar 
but telling passage, Locke says: 
Whosoever therefore out or a state or Nature unite into a Community, 
must be underslood to give up all the power, necessary to the ends for 
which they uni le into Society, to the majority of the Community, unless 
1hey expressly agreed in any number grealer than the majorily. And this 
is done by barely agreeing to 1111ite into 011e Political Society, which is all 
1he Compact thal is, or needs be, between Lhe Individuals, that enter into, 
or make up a Common-wealth. And thus that, which begins and actually 
constitutes a11y Political Society, is nothing but the consent or any number 
or Freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorp0rate into such a 
11 R. W. Gra111, Jo)m U x:kt's libtrulism (Chic:i..go 1987), p. 103. 
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Socie1y. And 1his is lhat, and thal only, which did , or could give 
begi1111ing 10 any lawful Govemmem in the World. (II . 99) 
The two passages quoted at length (11. 87 and 99) wgether give 
reason to think that the consenting individuals agree to whatever 
decisions and policies may be arrived at by a majority of the 
community . Indeed, the decrees of the majority seem to con-
stitutc the 'ru le of government,' as they are employed in the act 
of forming society (II. 132). With a single consensual agreement 
bringing some individuals out of the state of nature and under 
legitimate authority, Locke seems to highlight a sort of democ-
racy that is basic to political society, thereby linking political 
society with government, in such a way that the former cannot 
exist without the latter and vice versa.12 The implication of 
rebellion, however, undermines the integrity condition, for once 
the members resist the authority of government1, thereby nul-
1 ifying the initial consent , not only would the legitimate 
government, cease to exist. but pol itical society would cease to 
exist as wel l. The result would be a return to the state of nature 
(i f not a state of war).13 
The common origin of political society and government 
seems to have dealt a fatal blow to the claim that Locke's doc-
trine of resistance is compatible with the integrity condition. 
However, I believe they can be understood to be compatible, if 
only we focus on the other sense of the word 'government' that 
Grant attributes to Locke, here designated by 'governmenti' . If 
government2 means a designated form that is set up by the 
majority to be the trustee for the legislative and executive 
powers of the collective in an attempt to preserve property , then 
u Ibid .. p. 104. In addition, ·Whenever the StJCit'.f)' is dissoNed, 'tis certain lhe 
Governmenl 0( 1ha1 Society cannot remain' (II. 21 1). 
u In On the• etlg~ ,if u!furd,y, Simmons notes lhn.t 'the state of war is certainly not 
roe.1tt<11Sfrt' wil.h the $.late of ,,~wre:, ho"evtr, evm if it is nmsi~''""' with it' (p. 43). 
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it is correct for Grant to argue that political society has a 
temporal and theoretical priority over government2. It is tempo-
rally prior in so far as the 'Co11sritwio11 of the Legislative is the 
first and fundamental Act of Socicty'(II . 212), and it is theoreti-
cally prior in so far as government can be construed as 'an 
instrument of the society for the preservation of the society'. 14 
Consequently, once we acknowledge the priority of political 
society, we must also acknowledge that any attempt "ro assert an 
existential linkage between the two (that is, that the existence of 
political society presumes the existence of government and vice 
versa) is bound to fail. Arguing for the priority of political 
society suggests, 1hen, that political socie1y can exist, at least for 
the time being, without government2. The implication of this is 
significant, for it means that Locke' s doctrine of resistance is not 
necessarily antagonistic to society. Although withdrawal of the 
consent that creates government2, in the event that government2 
is remiss in its obligation to protect the property rights of the 
people, may result in some disorder, it does not necessarily lead 
to the dissolution of society. lndeed, the majority of society, 
who initially formed government2, may establish a new 
government2,. To put it in Locke's own words: 
[T]he Community may make compounded and mixed Forms of Govern-
ment, ilS they think good. And if the Legislative Power be at first given 
by the Majority 10 one or more Persons only for their Lives, or any 
limiled Lime, and 1hen the Supream Power to revert to them again; when 
it is so reverted, 1he Community may dispose of it again anew into what 
hands they please, and so constitute a new Form of Government. (II. 132) 
The integrity of the community can thus be maintained by focus-
ing on the second sense of government, a sense which allows 
Locke to distinguish the origin and dissolution of political 
'" Gra1u, op. c:i1.. p. 104. 
127 
society from thal of government Is 
This is nol, of course, 10 say that Locke advocated a Dual-
Consent (D-C) Theory as was discussed above, for simply to say 
that one consent establishes political society and another sets up 
government is to disregard Locke's use of C(lrtain words indica-
tive of liberalism and i1s allocation of rights and obligations that 
favour the individual.16 More specifically, it neglects lhe fact 
1hat Locke delineates two sorlS of consensual agreement that are 
associated with different institutions: that is, 'contract' is associ-
is Ibid. Frederick Pollock holds lhis view when he state$ that 'Locke ... is at no 
small pains 10 show that the dissolution of government is to be di.stingui.shed from that 
oi societies . .. Where the society is dissolved, the government cannot remain"; but 
govemrnen1s may be altered or dissolved frorn within, and the society not be 
destroyed' (A,1 introducrimr to 1he hb,1ory of 1he $de.nu tf politics (London L 96L ), p. 
76). 
Unlike Pollock, however, Gtanl underscores a prac1ical probltm that arises from 
lhis tcrmin:,logical cJistinc1ion: wt1e1her politicaJ SO<.iciy can exist without a designated 
form o( goYcmment long enough for the nuijori1y 10 create a new one (op. cit.. p. 
105). Can the community funccion a.s n unit in 1.he way th:i.1 government Functions? 
Since Lt>cke argues th;u people in $0C!c1y have the liberty to erect a new legi.slature 
when govcmmet11 has been dissolved. and that it is only through this liberty that 
socie1y c.-in preserve itself, he ~ms 10 suggest 1ha1 politicaJ society is nm viable in its 
b:.isic dcmocr.11ic form. In other words. Grant is not persuaded that 1he majority of a 
communit) can act in the wa)' that government can act in order to maintain society by 
rtSOlving, disputes among its members (ibid., p. 106). 
10 Some oommen1a1ors understand the I).(; Theory as involving a two-Slage 
agreemc.n1. For example, Pol!oct interprets Locke as saying thai one stage establishes 
political socie«y and another sets up government (Pollock, toe. cil.). The first stage is 
an agteement be1ween cenain individuals to live in a oornmo,,weahh (pac1u1t1 
union/.\') . h is only after this s1agc has bc.:t:n completed that tl1c second stage oc:curs, 
thal i.s, when the insti1utions of the c<>mmonwc.alth obtain their form by the placement 
o( power in the hands of those dcsigna1cd by the people of the. society (puctum swb-
jrctionis). 
L. J. Ma.cfatlane also suggests 1his interprtlatton when he s1ates: 'All that each 
and e\!try individual does in his initial common act of consent is to enter society on 
the understanding that some fonn of political organization will be necessary for its 
proper functlOning-"'the beginnilt11, of Poli rid:. Society depends upon the consent of 
the Individuals, 10 joyn into and make one Society; who, when they are thus 
incorpora1td, might SCI up what fonn of GO\'Cmment !hey thoug.hl fit"' (II. 106r (op. 
ci,. , p. 226). 
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ated with the founding of political society and 'trust' is associ-
ated wi1h the setting-up of government. This amounts to Locke 
endorsing a Contract-Trust (C-T) Theory of political society and 
government, which is compatible with 1he integrity condition as 
well as the moral inviolability condition. It is to this view that I 
now Lum. 
IV: The Contract-Trust Theory 
To find references to 1he C-T Theory in the literature on the 
Second Treatise, we need look no further than J. W. Gough's 
The social contract and his John Locke's political philosophy, 
and A. J. Simmons's more recent work, 011 the edge of anar-
chy: Locke, co11se111, and the limits ofsociery. 
Gough and Simmons develop 1his interpretation when they 
point to civil society as being established by a group of men 
agreeing to join and combine imo a community. Having recog-
nized the dangers of life in the state of nature, men agree to sur-
render in various degrees two kinds of rights on entering politi-
cal society: (I) the right ' to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the 
preservation of himself and 01hers within the permission of the 
law of Nature' is given up to the extent that ' the preservation of 
himself, and the rest of that Society shall require' (II. 128-9) 
and (2) the 'power 10 punish the Crimes committed against that 
Law [i.e., the Law of Nature] .. . he wholly gives up' (IT. 128 
and 130). This is, more or less, what is called political power, 
and it is this power 1ha1 is handed over by the contracting indi-
viduals 10 Lhe body politic. That is 10 say, once this contract is 
made and society is formed, the majority have the right to act on 
behalf of the rest of the members. This represents Simmons's 
first logical step to a complete society, expressed by Locke 
when he writes: 'Political Power is 1hat Power which every 
Man, having in the Slate of Nature, has given up into the hands 
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of the Society' (JI. 171),17 It is at this juncture that talk of 
government2 arises, for the first act of the community is the 
establishment of government2 in the guise of the legislative 
power (II. 212).18 This is Simmons's second logical step in the 
formation of a complete society .19 But whether we are talking 
about the relations of a king to his people or of a parliament to 
those it represents, there is no contract between government and 
the people. Rather, as Gough and Simmons note , government is 
formed by society' s granting a trust, thereby encrusting 
government wilh the power of the majority .20 
In an ordinary legal trust, such as that set up to administer 
the estate of a child, there are three different parties-truster, 
trustee, and beneficiary. But what we have in the Second 
Treatise is something quite different, for Locke's political trust 
is a relationship between only two parties-a trustee (govern-
ment2) and the truster (the people), who is also the beneficiary.21 
It is the latter who determines the terms of the trust, and 
11 Simm~, Q ,r ~he idgc <( w1archJ, p. 68. Simmons notes that the two $lcps 
1ha1 fonn pohhc.al $0C1cty and go\'Cmmcnt arc logically separate, though they may not 
be temporally scparible. 
" J. W. Gough. 1/,e social mntr(lt1 (Oxford 1936). pp. 129-33. 
19 Simmons, Joe . cit. 
2(1 In John Ux:ke ',> tHJlitkul pJtil,1wphy, 2nd 1:dn. (Oxford 1973), p. 161, Gough 
argues that there arc two fonns of political trust: o ne in which the executive acts as 
1h~ trustee for the people and anolher in which the legislalive .shoulders 1he burden of 
being Lhe truMee for the cleetor:ue. lns1ances of the executive truSt ~re. found in TI. 
IS3 ;rnd 11. 139. where:3$ inst3nces of the legislative trus-t are found in JI. l3S: II. 
136: :md II. 139. This is reircrntcd by Gerainl Parry in Jolm lhde (London 1978), 
wh~n. he says that 'Government, 10 repeaa, is not instituted hy the contract. h is the 
rcc1p1en1 of a power entrusted to it for the same purpose as it was originally wielded 
by th~ society it~elf-th~ p~rvation of propeny. Governmental authority is limited 
by 1h1s trust and LS forfeued 1f the trust is broken' (p. 101 ). 
ll Pany. op. cit.. p. 124. For a detailed description of the differences between 
con1tact and trust see Simmons. 011 1ht edge of anarchy, pp. 7 1-2. 
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therefore, the authority or discretionary power of the trustee. 
Employing the notion of trust rather than contract, as the kind of 
voluntary alienation or consent that establishes government2, has 
extremely important consequences for how Locke's doctrine of 
resistance relates to the moral inviolability condition. 
Of course, there are nay-sayers, like John Dunn and Martin 
Seliger, who quickly dismiss the importance of Locke's concep-
tion of trust as a legal or juridical trust, and instead present it as 
something akin to ' trustworthiness' .22 However, arguments have 
been advanced by such commentators as Ernest Barker to show 
that the trust as a legal notion is an important part of Locke's 
political theory. 'Locke uses the conception of Trust', Barker 
writes, 
and not that of Contract, to explain 'subjcc1ion'. The trust is a conccptioo 
pecul iar, on the whole, to English law. In private Jaw [Privatrec/11] the 
1rust means that A, as trustor, vests rights in B, as 1rustee, for 1he benefit 
of C, as cestui que trust or beneficiary of the trust. In public Jaw 
1Staatsrecht], 10 which Locke may be said to transfer the doclrine of 
1rust, 1he People or ' Public' (which is both the trustor Md the cestui que 
trust) acts in its capacity of trustor by way of conferring a 'fiduciary 
power' on the legislature (which thus becomes a lruStee), for the benefit 
of itself, and all its members, in its other capacity of cestui que trust or 
beneficiary o f the trust." 
The implication of this is not lost on Gough, for he turns to 
Barker's clarifying statement on what Locke's contract-trust 
distinction means for politics: 
n John Dunn, 'The Co1"epc oi "trus1" in the policies of John Locke' in 
Phifoso,!hy i11 l,ismry: EJu,yt 0 11 1hr historiography of philosophy, ed. R. Rony ~ al. 
(Cambrodge 1984). pp. 296-7 and Seliger, op. cil., p. 357. 
" E. Barker, N~tes to 0. Gierke, Natural law and th.cht0ry of s«ie,y, /5(/() I() 
I~. vol. I (Cambridge 1934), p. 299. Gough acknowledges Barl<er's clarifying nole 
to G1erke's wort, m John lockt.'s political philosophy, p. 155. 
131 
A 1rus1 is not a contract; and the trustee docs not enter into relations of 
contract with the truslOr-or with the beneficiary. Roughly, he may be 
said to consent to incur a unilateral obligation- an obligation to the 
beneficiary which, if it implies the trustee's possession and vindication of 
rights against other parties on behalf of that beneficiary, implies no rights 
for the trustee himself on his own behalf. If therefore political power be 
regarded as a trust. it follows that the Sovereign has not entered into a 
con1rac1 with the People, or the People with him-whether we regard the 
People as trustor or as beneficiary of the 1rus1. The trust, in its application 
to politics, leaves no room for a 'contract of subjection'.2' 
This interpretation of Locke as a proponent of the C-T 
Theory, it seems to me, is not only textually sound, but also 
reflecls his interest in safeguarding the liberties and rights of the 
people against the abuse of power by government2• That is, it 
represents the sort of institutional arrangement or practice 
needed to acknowledge the moral inviolability of the individuals 
of the community. Moreover, it acknowledges the basis for 
resistance to governmental authority, by establishing how 
governmeot2 becomes unilaterally obligated to the people i1 
serves. In the evem that government2 is remiss in its obligation 
10 preserve property, its constituents have the right to act 
towards this end even if it means taking up arms against the 
sovereign. 
V: Conclusion 
I have argued that while some commentators on Locke's Second 
Treatise are fond of pointing out the consensual foundations of 
political society and government, they fail to note the differences 
between the two institutions. Political society and government 
are either lumped together and their origin acknowledged to be 
24 B:.uker. ibid. Gougll (l'JOICS pan or the passage in Thr sodul ,:ontroc1, p. 134. 
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one contract (that is, the S-C Theory) or they are partially distin-
guished by means of the D·C Theory. Arguably, evidence for 
both interpretations can be found in various passages in the 
Second Treatise. In adopting these interpretations, however, 
they not only neglect key passages of the text, but they fail to 
acknowledge the insight that the C-T Theory has to offer in 
interpreting the Second Treatise as a document of revolutionary 
Libera lism that acknowledges the integrity of the community and 
the moral inviolability of the individual. By using the notions of 
contract and trust, Locke was able 10 escape through the horns 
of Hobbes's dilemma, leading him to a doctrine of resistance 
which allowed for an alternative other than anarchy or authori-
tarianism. 
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